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THE MARITIME DEFINITION OF AN UNSAFE
PLACE TO WORK
WILLIAM ALPER*
The precise definition under maritime law of the shipowner's duty
to provide seamen a safe place to work has been the subject of substantial,
troublesome and recent litigation. Is this duty rooted in concepts of
negligence, i.e., a duty to exercise reasonable care to provide a safe place?
Or, on the contrary, is this duty absolute, comparable to and co-extensive
with the duty to provide and maintain a seaworthy vessel? If the duty is
predicated upon concepts of negligence, then the shipowner must have
actual or constructive notice of the unsafe place, a basic tenet of negligence
liability. If the duty is absolute, then actual or constructive notice of the
condition is unimportant and the shipowner may be held liable even
though it had neither knowledge nor opportunity to know of the existence
of the condition - a species of liability without fault not unknown in
the maritime law.
A full grasp of the shipowner's responsibilities and duties to his seamen
cannot be attained without understanding the special working conditions
and position of seamen and the motivations of the courts and Congress
toward their protection. The seaman's occupation has no real counterpart
among shore employees. He travels through every climate; he is exposed
to many diseases, and to extremes of weather in every part of the world;
he experiences the fury and travail of heavy seas and storms; all of which
the shore worker would, or could, refuse to bear. These dangers, in
addition to the ship's own internal hazards, are the incidents of his
employment. The seaman's occupation has always demanded of him the
most rigid requirements of discipline and service to the vessel. During
his employment, he surrenders his personal liberty upon pain of punishment
for mutiny; the only involuntary servitude lawful under the thirteenth
amendment. 1 For these reasons and many others, seafaring nations from
earliest times have required the seaman's employer to maintain, care,
and protect him and have imposed corresponding and sometimes stringent
obligations upon the shipowner for his welfare and safety.
2
*LL.B. 1946, Temple University; Member of the Florida and Pennsylvania Bars.
1. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
2. Seas Shipping Co. vs. Sicracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Sims v. United States,
186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951). The roots of
the maritime law may be traced to biblical times, and reference thereto is found
in ancient Creek and Roman laws. Its more modern foundation lies in the codes of
the medieval trade towns, LAws OF IANsA ToWNs arts. XXXIX (1597), reprinted
30 Fed. Gas. 1197 (1897); LAws OF OLERON arts. VI, VII (circa. 1266), reprinted
30 Fed. Cas. 1171 (1897); LAws OF WisBuy arts. VIII, XIX (circa. 1200), reprinted
30 Fed. Cas. 1189 (1897); MARINE ORDINANCES OF Louis XIV arts. XI, XII (1681),
reprinted 30 Fed. Cas. 1203 (1897), and these roots have grown into the maritime law
of the United States incorporated from English law by the federal constitution.
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 373 (1924).
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It is in this context that the true nature and the proper definition
of the shipowner's duty to provide a safe place to work must be sought.
The key to the solution is found in two "landmarks" of the maritime
law: (I) the opinion of the Supreme Court in The Osceola,3 and (2) the
adoption by Congress of the Jones Act.4 In 1902, the Supreme Court
of the United States summarized the shipowner's liabilities to seamen in
The Osceola:5
2. That the vessel and her owner are, . . liable to an
indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of
the unseaworthiness of the ship....
3. That all the members of the crew . . . arc, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for
injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of
the crew ....
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity
for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew. . .
(Emphasis added.)
The shipowner's liability in damages to his crew thus was limited
to the doctrine of unseaworthincss. This was and is a duty and concomitant
liability peculiar to the maritime law; the absolute and non-delegable duty
to provide a safe and seaworthy vessel and to supply and keep in order
the appliances appurtenant thcrcto,6 and has no relationship to concepts
of negligence such as scienter and the exercise of reasonable care.7 Although
the maritime law imposed this stringent liability for unscaworthiness, it
afforded no remedy for damages to seamen caused by the negligence of
the officers or fellow crew members of the vessel., This gap in the ship-
owner's responsibility to the seaman was not bridged until enactment of
the Jones Act ini 1920, which incorporated into the maritime law, for
the scaian's benefit the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act." The Jones Act finally made the shipowner liable to seamen for
acts of negligence and abolished the defenses of fellow servant and
assumption of risk.' 0 With this statutory modification of the maritime
law in 1920, the shipowner became liable to the crew not only for
defective or unsafe conditions within the concept of unseaworthiness, an
absolute liability without fault,' but also for the negligence of his
servants and employees.
3. 189 U.S. 159 (1902).
4. 56 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
5. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1902).
6. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mahnick v, Southern S.S. Co.,
321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 159 (1902).
7. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
8. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
159 (1902).
9. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
10, Sacony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939).
11. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), the injury resulted from
a hidden flaw in a shackle supporting the boom of a new vessel. Although the shipowner
had no opportunity to discover a hidden defect in a vessel's gear on its maiden voyage,
he was held liable, nevertheless, for failure to provide a seaworthy vessel.
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The fact that the seaman could not recover damages for negligence
until adoption of the Jones Act is crucial in recognizing the true concept
of the maritime duty to provide a safe place to work. This is so because
the duty to provide a safe place was recognized by the maritime law
before the Jones Act. Because the maritime law before 1920 did not
recognize the seaman's right to recover for negligence, the maritime duty
to provide a safe place could not have been cast in terms of negligence,
but bad to be considered analagous to and co-extensive with the doctrine
of unscaworthiness, the only other basis for liability.
In The Frank and Willie,12 a seaman sought damages for injuries
caused by the fall of a cargo of lumber after the mate had been warned
that the method of unloading had crcated an unsafe place to work. The
shipowner contended that this constituted negligence of a fellow servant
for which there could be no recovery under the then existing maritime
law. The court, conceding that the libclant could not recover for negligence,
nevertheless held the shipowner liable and, after pointing out that the
mate had required the seaman to work in a dangerous place, stated:la
This was breach of a duty owed by the ship and owners to the
seaman, for which the ship and owners are liable. Employers are
required to provide workmen with reasonably safe conditions for
work, according to the nature of the business, and to the customary
provisions for the safety of life and limb. This is emphatically so
as regard seamen, who are bound to obedience, and have not
a landsman's option to throw up work. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, the facts in this case established not only an unsafe place of
work, but also a classic case of negligence. However, recovery was allowed
only for failure to provide a safe place, not negligence. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court specifically discussed The Frank and Willie opinion in
The Osceola,"4 and, after pointing out that the mate's negligent failure
to provide a safe place to work caused the injury, said that "the question
was really one of unseaworthiness and not of negligence."'5 In Gerrity v.
The Bark Kate Caunn,6 the court held the shipowner liable for failure to
provide a reasonably safe place to work, stating:' 7
I proceed, therefore, to the inquiry whether the owner of this
ship . . . became charged with any duty toward the libelant in
respect to the stowage of the dunnage and plank that caused the
injury in question. It was so arranged, that from its nature, it
was dangerous to all persons who might be in that part of tile
between-decks. . . . The danger arose not from any use of the
thing, but from the thing itself.
12. 45 Fed. 494 (2d Cir. 1891).
13. Id. at 496.
14. 189 U.S. 158 (1902).
15. Id. at 175.
16. 2 Fed. 241 (2d Cir. 1880).
17. Id. at 245.
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Such being the character of this structure, in case the mass
was not properly secured, if the libelant was in the between-
decks of this ship in the exercise of a right to be there, the
ship-owner owed him a duty to see that dunnage and plank were
properly secured, which duty was not properly performed.
The libelant had, therefore, a right to be where he was; and
it follows that there was a duty on the part of the owner to see
to it that the dunnage and plank stowed above him were so
secured as to prevent its falling upon him of its own weight.
Here again the failure to provide a safe place to work is spoken of in
terms bearing striking resemblance to liability for unseaworthiness. These
cases allowed the seamen to recover damages for the shipowner's failure
to provide a safe place although the maritime law did not then permit
the seaman to recover for negligence; their basis had to be the doctrine
of unseaworthiness.
The Jones Act of 1920 added to the maritime law the shipowner's
liability to its crew for negligence, giving the seaman a right of recovery
for negligence in addition to the already existing remedies for failure to
provide a safe place to work or a seaworthy vessel and appurtenances.
The statute did not purport to cut away any of the then existing rights
of the seaman or to reduce his protection for injuries caused in the service
of the vessel; on th contrary, its purpose was to give seamen additional
protection by permitting recovery for negligence. Notwithstanding, with
the advent of the seaman's statutory right of recovery for negligence,
some courts began to speak of all the seamen's rights of indemnity solely
in terms of negligence, including the "negligent" failure to provide a
safe place to work. Obviously, the seaman's proof of an unsafe place in
many instances also established the shipowner's express or implied knowledge
of the condition. s It became easier for the courts to impose the liability
on the basis of negligence, the adopted common law doctrine, without
reference to the maritime concept. Finally, some opinions defined the
liability for an unsafe place to work solely in terms of negligence and
abandoned the concept of liability without fault in its application to the
duty to provide a safe place.' Thus, the Jones Act was unwittingly used
by some courts to circumscribe the seamen's protection instead of
enlarging it.
18. See The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed. 494 (1891), for illustration and example.
19. Fodera v. Booth-American Shipping Corp., 65 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1946),
aff'd., 159 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1947). 'his laxity ii judicial reasoning also occurred in
connection with the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Some of the trial courts began to hold
that the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness was predicated upon "negligence" in
failing to provide a safe and seaworthy vessel and appurtenances and that the shipowner's
duty was merely to exercise reasonable care to provide a seaworthy vessel, and was not
absolute. See Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928). This gave rise to
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946) where the Supreme Court unequivocally disassociated the doctrine
of unseaworthiness from concepts of negligence and restored this doctrine to its
traditional absolute liability definition under the maritime law.
19591
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However, other courts correctly recognized that the Jones Act's addition
of negligence to the seaman's remedies did not in any way affect his already
existing right to a safe place to work and a seaworthy vessel. These courts
construed the duty to provide a safe place and a seaworthy vessel as
synonymous absolute liabilities, as expressed in The Seeandbee:20
A seaman does not assume the risk of injury even from obvious
dangers if the proximate cause thereof is the failure of the
shipowner or master to supply and keep in order the proper
appliances appurtenant to the ship and the same rule applies
for failure to provide a safe place in which to work.
The uncontrovcrted evidence in the case at bar shows that the
pump with its rapidly moving and unguarded parts was located on
one side of a narrow passageway directly opposite a guarded
revolving fan and further shows that had the pump been guarded
the libelant would not have fallen into it. This constituted an
unsafe place in which to work and iade the ship unseaworthy,
and was the proximate cause of his injury. (Emphasis added.)
In Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,2' Chief Justice Stone correlated
the shipowner's duty to provide a safe place to work with the warranty
of seaworthiness (although not squarely deciding the issue) as follows: 2
In thus refusing to limit, by application of the fellow servant nile,
the liability of the vessel and owner for unseaworthiness, this
Court fin The Osceolal was but applying the familiar and then
well established rule of non-maritime torts, that the employer's
duty to furnish the employee with safe appliances and a safe place
to work, is noidelegable and not qualified by the fellow servant
rule. (Emphasis and material in brackets added.)
This same approach was used by the Supreme Court in Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger,23 where the Court imposed liability for a transitory
condition creating an unsafe place to work using principles of unseaworthi-
ness. In that case, a can, which ordinarily contained coal oil and was
so labeled, was negligently filled with gasoline, and exploded while being
used to start a fire. The trial court charged the jury that the seaman
could recover on the basis of negligence. The Supreme Court held that
the jury should have been instructed that the vessel was unseaworthy
if the can marked "coal oil" contained gasoline and that liability could
be imposed upon the shipowner for a transitory unsafe place without
regard to concepts of negligence.
The trend toward the "negligence definition" of unsafe place to work
reached its zenith in Cookingham v. United States,.24 where the seaman
20. 102 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1939).
21. 321 US. 96 (1944).
22. Id. at 102.
23. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
24. 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950).
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slipped on some jello but did not prove the duration prior to his accident
of this unsafe condition. These facts required a determination of the
exact definition of the maritime doctrine of unsafe place to work. The
seaman contended that the doctrine was assimilated to and required
application of principles of liability for unseaworthiness, i.e., liability
without fault, thus making unnecessary proof that the shipowner knew
or should have known of the condition. The court of appeals rejected
this view, holding that there was an absence of required proof of negligence
and further that a temporarily unsafe place to work of short duration did
not constitute unseaworthiness. 275 Seemingly, the court of appeals returned
to the discarded doctrine of negligence as a prerequisite for liability for
unseaworthiness,20 a doctrine which already had been rejected by the




The Cookingham doctrine has since been followed in the Third2 8
and First29 Circuits, and in the California state courts, 0 but has been
rejected and severely criticized in the Seconds' and Ninth Circuits.32
In Poignant v. United States,33 the seaman slipped on an apple skin
under circumstances where the shipowner had no actual or implied notice
of the unsafe place and the trial court held that plaintiff had failed to
prove negligence. The appellate court, conceding the lack of negligence,
nevertheless reversed for further proceedings because the proofs sustained
liability for failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work and unsea-
worthiness. The court relied upon recent decisions of the Supreme Court,"4
rejected the majority view in the Cookingham case and adopted the
dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Biggs in that casc. 5 Judge Frank in a
25. Note vigorous dissent by Chief Judge Biggs, Id. at 215.
26. Plamals v. The Pinar 1)el Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
27. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
28. Brabazon v. Bellships Co., 202 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1953); Shannon v. Union
Barge Line Corp., 194 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1952); Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co.,
99 F. Stpp. 173 (D. Del 1951); Adamowski v. Gulf Oil Corp., 93 F. Supp. 115
(E.D. Pa. 1950).
29. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1959). A petition
for certiorari is presently pending in the Supreme Court in this case.
30. Gladstone v. Matson Navigation Co., 269 P.2d 37 (Cal. App. 1954); Blodow v.
Penn Pacific Fisheries, Inc., 275 P.2d 795 (Cal. App. 1954); Although Cookingham
was followed in Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 120 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1954),
it was subsequently rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; see footnote
31 infra.
31. Grillca v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956): Poignant v. United
States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955); Palazzolo v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d
277 (2d Cir. 1954); DiSalvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F.Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
32. Johnson Line v. Maloney, 243 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1957); Pacific Far East
Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 234 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1956); Lahde v. Soc. Armadora Del
Norte, 220 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
33. 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
34. Boudoin v. Lyles Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Petterson v. Alaska
S.. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curin,, 347 US. 396 (1954).
35. 184 F.2d 213, 215 (1950).
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concurring opinion rejected the Cookingham doctrine in the following
language:36
Here, the defendant owed the plantiff an absolute duty to provide
a safe place to work . . . (p. 603) the 'transitory" loctrine to
mean that the ship's liability for a 'transitory" object depends
upon the length of time during which the object was not removed.
See Crawford v. Pope Talbot, Inc., 3 Cir., 286 F. 2d 794, 789-790.
1 understand that my colleagues repudiate that thesis. The Third
Circuit, in a still later case, explaining the Cookingham doctrine,
has said that it turns on a distinction between (a) the duty
to provide a seaworthy ship, which is absolute, and (b) the
duty to provide a safe place to work, which, so that Court
holds, demands reasonable care only. See Brabazon v. Bellships
Co., 3 Cir., 202 F. 2d 904, 906. I think that distinction directly
at odds with the Suprente Court's decisions. I read my colleagues'
opinion as repudiating it also. (Emphasis added.)
The courts have justified imposition of liability without fault for
unseaworthiness because of the helplessness of seamen to protect them-
selves from the elements, the hazards of marine service, the internal
hazards of the vessel, and the ability of the shipowner, in contract with the
marine worker, to distribute the loss in the shipping community. 7 These
same considerations have equal application to the shipowner's duty to
provide the seaman with a safe place to work. Both duties have their
roots in the same economic and social sources and the need for their
application is identical. Substantially both species of liability arise from
the courts' recognition of the proposition that seamen should be free
of unnecessary dangers in the performance of their duties, whether these
dangers are known or unknown to the vessel or its owner. The shipowner's
obligation to provide the seaman with a safe place to work is co-extensive
with and identical to its obligation to provide and maintain a seaworthy
vessel and appurtenances. These obligations are not only affirmative and
absolute, but are continuing in character and are both inalienable and
non-delegable. The shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness and failure to
provide a safe place to work is effective to indemnify the seaman for any
injuries caused thereby upon mcrc proof that these conditions existed
without any proof of negligence. Both obligations existed in the maritime
law before the adoption of the Jones Act in 1920 and, of necessity, they
had to be predicated upon theories of absolute liability and not upon
principles of negligence. Negligence, as a basis for seaman's indemnity
was not then recognized in the maritime law. The tests of "foreseecability,"
"knowledge" and "the reasonable man," all necessary for determination
of the shipowner's liability for negligence should not be factors in
36. 225 F.2d 595, 602 (1955).
37. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); The H.A. Scandredt, 87
F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937); The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944, 945 (4th Cir.
1936).
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determining the shipowner's liability for failure to satisfy the maritime
obligation to provide a safe place to work.
The definition and application of the maritime doctrine of a safe
place of work has been the subject of vigorous argument and conflicting
judicial viewpoints in recent years. Since Mahnich v. Southern Steamship
Co.,38 the question has not reached the Supreme Court even collaterally.
The conflict between the Third and First Circuits and the Second and
Ninth Circuits3" indicates the strong possibility that the Supreme Court
to resolve this conflict will grant certiorari in the next case raising the
question.
38. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
39. See cases cited notes 31, 32, 38, 39 supra.
